Sorry for the delay. I was busy moving and all and I've just noticed the replies. I'll reply in a few hours, when I get back home.
Take your time with writing your replies. For example, reading what I wrote more carefully. This isn't a race, there's no hurry... personally I think it's preferable to conduct a slow, more productive discussion than a sloppy, quick one. Anyway, I would never have time for an extended conversation on a forum or email if I didn't take my time with replies, so I will have to do that.
All in all, I'd say we do have a lot in common, only that I still dispute your claim that Ayn Rand was "a student of Nietzsche".
Well, she studied his work so, that makes her a student doesn't it? Neither was she a disinterested student, by all accounts. I'm not sure why we're arguing about this.
What does "true" mean, accurate? Anyway, in this case there's no coincidence, that's well established like I said.
In accordance with reality, to a practical degree.
As I've discussed, precisely what "accordance with reality" or even "reality" means has yet to be established. That is central to the debates over objectivism contra empirical evidence for subjectivist/perspectivist semi-creation of experienced reality, and indeed common observational experience for it. But more on that later.
As for the supposed link, that's what we're trying to establish.
No, a "link" is established. The degree and kind of it is what we're discussing, correct? Unless you deny, against all evidence, she read Nietzsche and expressed some degree of affinity for his ideas, at least until an abrupt break (she did that with a lot of people she once favored). Which has been corroborated even by high-ranking Objectivists from "The Collective" as they called her inner circle such as Leonard Peikoff.
Perhaps we're running up against English language communication problems here, and throughout? Unfortunately I don't comprehend Romanian, so we'll have to make do.
"you like to see him as an artist, an existentialist,"
I don't know precisely what you mean by the term. I find it odd that he's often labelled that way, except in the sense that the later writers called that picked up on some of his themes.
"Existence precedes essence"... man has no intrinsic values, he must define them. The themes of choice, nihilism, etc. ... these are existentialism, not its precursors.
Just a (rather pedantic) question of semantics. Some call Nietzsche Existentialist due to N's discussions of some of the same issues. Some call him a precursor, probably because he did not use the term. The word is just one of many conventional jargonistic labels used in canonical philosophy. Would you call nominalists existentialists, for example, because that position forms an important part of the historical development of ideas connected with "Existentialists"? Do you call Stirner one? At what point you draw the lines does not matter much, except for stock clerk style cataloguing of philosophical history, which really doesn't interest me much. If one wanted to, I am sure one could draw out just as much of an argument for disagreement between Nietzsche and, say, Sartre, and why they shouldn't be lumped together by the same term.
Are we talking about the same person? Nietzsche was a critic, often the staunchest of critics of all but one of those things. He does call himself a "good European" but that's mostly as a counter to nationalism — in my
last article I pointed out that Europe was his world, so that's much like being cosmopolitan and international today. I can elaborate on his criticisms of the things you list if you really want to argue that case, but you'd be arguing the Nazi interpretation which was lifted uncritically by some American scholars until Kaufmann set things straight.
The Nazis themselves identified him as one of their ideologues. Of course, that doesn't mean much, but the claim is older.
That is precisely what I alluded to. The Nazi intellectuals' and their forerunners' attempts to claim him as a precursor with a highly selective reading of only some of his works (manipulated by his racist and nationalist sister after his catatonia and death), which has been mostly discredited finally, is the reading you have chosen to adopt, rather uncritically as far as I can tell. Why do them a favor and him such a disservice?
We wrote, especially in the Will to Power, about an European state ruled by Overmen, a militaristic state which uses violence as the pressure that "turns coal into diamonds".
Funny, I don't remember reading all that. Citation(s), please? (Also didn't know you worked with old Friedrich — "We"? ;p )
In any case as I expressly pointed out in my last reply, he never published that as a book or intended it as such. It is not the final statement of ideas his sister and other editors claimed in order to market it. It is hardly going to be representative, and certainly should be read as less critical than the works he intended, finished, and wanted people to read. That "book" is just a collection of notes, some brilliant, some far from brilliant. Some like his other works, some not at all. Some notes were probably the product of self-therapy for horrendous bad moods and terrible health, or drugged-up hazes (since he took quite a few in order to function). The notes have been rearranged and a subject-oriented order imposed upon them in order to publish them as a book, under the title he briefly considered using for a more systematic work, but scrapped in favor of publishing The Antichrist. To read "TWTP" as just as representative as his real books, much less MORE important to understanding his thought, is to ignore all the pertinent qualifying facts.
I agree that he writes negatively of the State in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but in TSZ he's more likely referring to his contemporary German State.
There are numerous negative comments throughout his books about the (modern) State, not simply the new German Bismarckian one. His particular ire for that one evidently has much to do with his personal knowledge of it, but also its militarism, crass populism, systemization, and regimentation, and how that ruins culture understood as what supports the development of remarkable and sensitive individuals. See The Gay Science for example. That critique extends to politics in general. Any qualifications to Nietzsche's usual disapproving attitudes to centralized politics and its habits appear to me to be rare, throughout all his works.
You may be mistaking his non-judgmental accounting of what happens in a state and the motivations for it, for endorsement of it. In The Will to Power in particular there are quite a few passages about that. I think people find this confusing, which may be why he, again, chose not to publish those parts in their extant form. Remember that in his own day there were already ultra-nationalist racists (proto-Nazis, basically) trying to claim him, from whom he took pains to distance himself.
Actually, you oversimplify. Nietzsche's discussions on the subject are primarily responding to a (primarily Xtian) tradition of philosophy that asserts a certain kind of simplistic and often absolutist "free will" devoid of modification so that it can assign agency....
I gave this example as a difference between him and Ayn Rand.
There's no need to misrepresent the man in order to do that. It makes a good example of the point I was making about their differences in levels of sophistication and intellectual depth, and for that matter, curiosity. I submit that the differences are not well represented simply by comparing and contrasting positions, but by superficiality versus depth in philosophical exploration. One also has to consider what the climate of opinion was like during their different places and times. As I pointed out in what I linked, in the heritage Nietzsche was primarily arguing against, something called "free will" in an inner sense was used as a tool of metaphysical control over individuals and suppression, just as in Rand's climate, the dismissal of a "free will" in an apparent, expressive sense was a tool of social control — we are more familiar still with the latter. Both N and R can be read as wanting to liberate the individual as far as their intention/spirit, in that respect. But from a positional standpoint, they would appear to disagree.
but she really did think that rational men and women were all essentially accessing the same continuum of experiential reality. She thought we can all basically plug in to the same thing in other words, with a epistemological simplicity recalling Descartes and Aristotle.
The process ought to be the same, reason, and as for sense data, how differently can people living 1 block apart of each other, in New York, see the world?
Are you kidding? You're practically making my point for me, here. Hmm, let's see: how differently do you think Ayn Rand, living in Manhattan, and someone else in her block could see the world? Pretty differently, I'd say, depending on who they were. How differently can a Christian admirer of social welfare who grew up in South America see the world, compared to a Russian expatriate atheist? =D To a labor class activist indoctrinated in Marx every smokestack might symbolize the enslavement of the worker, to Rand an engine of free production and a symbol of man's mind, to someone else, just a part of the skyline they never notice at all.
To make my point less superficially, location supplies but one kind of commonality of experience, and actually does not supply that necessarily, since very different experiences can be had in the same city. Physiology, valuation process, aesthetics, life experience, attribution of attention, etc. may all still differ enormously, and so would how much someone pays attention, gathers, interprets and judges sense information in order to experience it. In fact if quantum mechanics is correct, even a twin who could hypothetically inhabit the same space for a whole lifetime might see the world differently as a result of potential for randomness accumulated subatomically in chaotic ways. The "same" person would in effect not be the same, for having different past experience and thus, now have a different way of experiencing reality.
The point is, our brains give meaning to sense data. According to neuroscientists and other indications there is no raw sense data we ever experience, without active interpretation. Since our brains are composed of many interrelated autopoietic systems, past experience informs interpretation and alters how we apparently experience "reality." We are part of the process, and since we differ individualistically and even one individual differs depending on states of consciousness, development, etc. it can descriptively be said that we create our own realities, along limitations of course. That those "limitations" constitute a consistent set of objective reality is by no means clear, or indicated by the facts. Indeed, different limitations to possibilities appear to be operative depending on the context — for example, quantum physics paying attention to small-scale powerful forces at subatomic levels versus astronomical physics paying attention to the weaker force of gravitation operative at larger scales.
In We the Living she presents a totally different situations and a character which slowly discovers the "I"... all in all, I support my initial point about "objectivity".
The I is the subject of subjectivity. This is why I think she stopped short, at a very good model, but not a perfect, complete, and certainly not universally "objective" one. Look, this somewhat cryptic
Interlude is relevant:
Limitations of 'the self' as a model, and having to take care.Humans have individual limitations to the kind of subject they can be, and thus their perspectives cannot be shared. Would you call that an objective fact, or a human fact? I would say human, more accurately. As long as we understand that much, though — and admittedly, there are many who have not, and mistake humanity for a collectivist phenomenon — we need to go well beyond the common context of that model. Individuality as a basic prerequisite of advantageous philosophy for people surely works as a fact, but that's really just the beginning. Rand did not often go much further than individualism, Nietzsche did go within and beyond frequently. That's one point my essay was trying to make, if you go back and look at it.
Incidentally, current views and evidence in science do not even support that 'weak' objectivism, which I believe is more like the usual meaning of the term apart from Ayn Rand's adaptation of it. Nietzsche's "perspectivism" as his subjectivism is often called has been supported by the subsequent century of similar ideas in various fields such as psychology and quantum mechanics. Robert Anton Wilson gives a decent summary of this in introducing his book "Quantum Psychology."
If the quantum theory of reality is "fuzzy", you assume reality itself must be "fuzzy". There's no basis on which you can deny the existence of an
There's no basis on which you can prove it, either. And actually, although you can't disprove it, experiments and plenty of common experience indicate it's not the best model. Even the dual models of light indicate perspectivism.
Especially the "exterior" part. We experience the world through our bodies including our brains, after all, which are part of the world and made of the same subatomic "particles."
"Fuzzy" is not the best term though, i don't think. I should think
unpredictable, or
selectively predictable within isolated systems and according to probabilities, are more exacting descriptive phrases according to quantum mechanics and chaos theory. Again that does not suggest you can make up reality to suit your whims, it's not about that.
I personally don't think that one can have a perfect model of reality, but that's besides the point.
No, that's not at all besides the point. You're absolutely correct about that I think, and it's important. That's the basis of operative, contextual adaptability, as is demanded by perspectivism and analogues. One can match more or less accurate models to a particular usage or context, a bit like curve fitting (presuming that one realizes the instability, complexity and inconstancy of that 'curve' symbolizing reality in most cases.)
Ayn Rand argued for an universe with Identify. Not necessarily that we can know it perfectly, but that it exists and that we can know it by developing theories.
I think you mean identity?
Practically nobody argues the universe doesn't exist. Although, it's probably meaningless to argue either way. What does existence mean, if the universe — everything, apparently — does not exist? Or does exist? Just words.
That may very well be, but you don't address his militarism,
I certainly did. And more, in this reply.
his demand that we learn "how to hurt people" (since suffering is something anyone does these days, or something like that), his total disregard for any contemporary Economics system, that he explicitly rejects any kind of humanism or individual rights, and so on.
Look, if you don't understand him, don't draw conclusions. And it seems to me you do not understand what he's talking about.
I never said that there aren't any thing of value in his work, but turning some of his most unpleasant opinions into metaphors is not something I'm willing to do.
I respect the existence of your intellectual conscience, but in that case you should read more of his work and/or more attentively, frankly.
So, why do you insist on a connection? She knew some of his works, but considering the disagreements between them... I really don't see it. We can discuss the particularies of Nietzsche another time.
I'm more interested in discussing distortions of Nietzsche. If you really don't see the connection, what can I say? It leapt out at me. It has leapt out at many people who have read (at least) Rand's novels and (at least) some Nietzsche, including several I've known personally. In fact, you are the first person I know who has deliberately stated you don't see this evident derivation which appears pretty obvious to other people. Well, what can I say? Maybe this is because you're comparing later Rand to N rather than earlier Rand, maybe you're determined not to see it, or maybe you're the only one who's right here. In any case, I don't think the debate over that is particularly productive. Drawing out the meat of Nietzsche is a much more serious issue because I think there is so much wealth there you're not recognizing, it's a shame not to profit from it using a reading which will allow you to, as it seems to me you have not.
Of course he held the lowest common denominator in contempt! No authentic humanist, knowing that the potential of humanity arises first in individuals, could do otherwise. To love humanity with affirmation you must also be willing to negate what holds us back.
His view of humanity lacks a certain perspective later expressed by Freud and Jung. All this talk of "becoming" and his obvious hatred of the common man are painstakingly incompatible with any respect for the human species, as it is. We can dream of a future uber-race, but his anti-humanies points to exactly this disownment of his contemporaries.
What "certain perspective"?
If he disowns his contemporaries, why bother to write not only books but voluminous correspondence? More accurately, his contemporaries disowned him, gabriel.
As for the present day "common man," I confess to some contempt at present as well. In N's day the masses were mindlessly cheering on the accumulation of the socialized, militarist, bureaucratic Bismarckian-style state, which would set the tone for the 20th century regimes of National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy among others. In my time too, the masses in America cheer on Bush et al.'s warfare and welfare statism with little thought or care for the future. How can one respect half-realized individuals (at best!) who have so little respect for individual lives that they simply don't care what happens to other people, and indeed from their lifestyles, have very little regard at all for their own selves? if it weren't for the promise of the future embodied in certain individuals already, it would be hard to care about the human species. You can call me a misanthrope too if you want, but I think that it's just realistic. One has to admit, human beings need to make progress from here, not be happy with the way things are... and things are the way they are, because humans are the way they are.
Anti-capitalism? he has both positive and negative things to say. Overall though, it's fairly clear he had little knowledge or interest in economics.
You mean, like the view of Max Weber? Perhaps, but this is another major point of disagreement between him and Ayn Rand. She's all about the filthy, all-too-common, fly-infested market.[/QUOTE]
Ah, I think I can clear something up here. The usual modern sense of "the market" is a totally different thing from Nietzsche allusion to "the marketplace" or agora when he speaks of "the flies of the marketplace", etc. The latter regards the classical philosophical tradition in which the agora is the common area where the mob hangs out in the polis and petty politics gets discussed. The agora is not directly translatable into modern terms as just "market." It has significance in philosophical tradition (and particularly for Nietzsche the philologist) as a symbol of common boorishness, and of politics. It should not be confused with the modern terminology of using the word "market" to mean a network of economic exchange. The agora is often more significant of politics than economics, in fact, sometimes it symbolizes the socioeconomic aspect exclusively in philosophical discussion. There need not even be a market trade going on in the agora, but it is always the place where people at large hang around and gossip. If modern translations of Nietzsche used "agora", this confusion would be more easily avoided.
Really, of all N wrote remarkably little of it could be considered economic in focus. He's mainly interested in economic circumstances from a cultural point of view, where he does mention it.
Violence worship? The image of the rapacious barbarian (the famous "blond beast") eventually tamed by Xtianity is hardly positive. Nor all negative. Nietzsche didn't do the categorical judgment thing, which is another way he really sets himself apart from Rand.
Regardless of any linguistic gymnastics, it's clear to us both where he stood on the role of force/violence in a future society. This references his preference for militarism.
Well your mind reading skills must be off today, because that isn't clear to me at all. I think that taken in all, his writing in the subjects of violence, war, force, etc. are not entirely consistent. I sense some ambivalence there. I think there is a conflict between different strains in his thinking, including a traditional heroic ethos connected with war (as my previous
link pointed out, this is before WWI which changed such things), and an appraisal of regimentation associated with militarism as injurious to the development of individuals, and violence as dangerous, and force as oppressive to individuals for the most part, etc. Since he was strenuously trying to exemplify amor fati and not resenting his horrible physical state, and essentially that was the product of involvement in the Franco-Prussian war, some of his acceptance of the risk of war should definitely be attributed to that.
Of course if you want to talk militarism, go no further than Rand's advocation of war against the slave pens of Russia. How one frees by killing, I've no idea. To this day, Objectivists follow that lead regarding Iraq, for example. Individualism does not seem to apply regarding thinking about foreigners, who get lumped together and are taken to stand in for their country's rulership, and thus can be bombed, conquered, etc.
Okay, well this got to be long and I'm going to put it up first, but I really intended it to go together with my reply to your second one of the two you last put up, whenever I can finish that.
Objectivism